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This paper explores the extent to which decision makers in a naturalistic environment, the Hong Kong
horserace betting market, anchor their probability judgments on highly visible information and make
insufﬁcient adjustments in the light of additional data. Linear regression and conditional logit models
are employed to examine the extent to which certain types of information are over-represented in
market odds. The results suggest that, in contrast to much of the research on anchoring conducted in
laboratories, the Hong Kong betting public do not anchor their judgements on past performances of
horses, jockeys or trainers.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rationality of human behaviour and the quality of human judgment have
been explored by researchers within disciplines such as economics,
management, and psychology. Neoclassical economic theories assume that
individuals are able to gather all the information they need without time and
cost constraints and that they have sufﬁcient intellectual capacity to solve
complicated decision tasks (Savage, 1954). However, in the real world,
individuals are not fully rational. Under time and/or cost pressure and within
the constraints of their limited knowledge and cognitive capacity, they employ
simple ‘heuristics’ to undertake complex decision tasks (Simon, 1988). These
rules of thumb are useful in making rapid decisions but they may result in
systematic biases (Kahneman et al., 1982; Kahneman and Tversky, 1972;
Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). This paper explores the degree to which
decision makers in a real world setting, the horserace betting market, employ
one of the most common heuristics, anchoring and adjustment.
Laboratory research suggests that people make absolute estimates by
starting from an initial value and make adjustments upwards or downwards
from it. However, these adjustments are often insufﬁcient (eg, Cohen, 1993b;
Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). This phenomenon has become known as the
anchoring and adjustment heuristic. It has been argued that although strong
anchoring effects have been demonstrated in a number of laboratory-based
studies, insufﬁcient investigation of this phenomenon has been conducted
in real world decision-making environments (Liu and Johnson, 2006). To
emphasize this point we identify a number of features that distinguish
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naturalistic from laboratory environments and highlight the advantages of
studying the impact of the anchoring heuristic in a real world setting. To ﬁll
the gap between laboratory and real world studies in this area we examine the
extent to which horserace bettors in Hong Kong anchor their judgements.
The paper is organized as follows. A brief review of existing research on
anchoring effects is provided in section II. In section III features which
distinguish naturalistic from laboratory-based settings are identiﬁed and the
advantages of exploring anchoring effects in naturalistic environments, and in
horserace betting markets in particular, are discussed. The data and
procedures used to analyse anchoring effects in the Hong Kong pari-mutuel
betting market are described in section IV. The results are presented in section
V and interpreted in section VI. Conclusions and suggestions for further
research are developed in section VII.
II. ANCHORING AND ADJUSTMENT
When making judgments and decisions under time and/or cost pressure,
individuals are often found to employ simple rules of thumb (heuristics) to
make relatively quick and sound decisions (Kahneman et al., 1982; Kahneman
and Tversky, 1972; Simon, 1955, 1988; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). One of
these rules of thumb, the anchoring and adjustment heuristic, has received
considerable attention in the literature. It has been demonstrated that
adjustments from an initial starting point or ‘anchor value’ are often insufﬁcient
(eg, Kahneman et al., 1982; Kahneman and Tversky, 1972; Mussweiler and
Strack, 1999; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
Two types of anchoring effects have been identiﬁed: (i) traditional and (ii)
basic. Traditional anchoring effects were ﬁrst identiﬁed by Tversky and
Kahneman (1974) and these are the main focus of the anchoring literature. It is
thought these involve two judgmental steps: individuals ﬁrst compare the
target value with the anchor value and then make an absolute evaluation of the
target to arrive at their ﬁnal judgement (eg, Cervone and Peake, 1986; Joyce
and Biddle, 1981; Mussweiler and Strack, 1999; Quattrone et al., 1984; Russo
and Schoemaker, 1989; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). For example, subjects
were asked to estimate the percentage of African countries in the United
Nations. They were ﬁrst required to estimate whether the answer was higher or
lower than a randomly generated number, and then they were required to give
their own estimates. Final judgements were highly inﬂuenced by the random
number: low estimates being associated with low random numbers and vice
versa (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
A second form of anchoring has also been identiﬁed: basic anchoring.
This arises when individuals’ ﬁnal judgments are inﬂuenced by anchor values
even though they are not required to make direct comparisons between initial
values and ﬁnal judgments; target values have been shown to be inﬂuenced
by anchor values even if the anchor is completely irrelevant to the target
(Brewer and Chapman, 2002; Wilson et al., 1996). Wilson et al. (1996) argue
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that if individuals anchor on arbitrary anchors even without being asked to do
so, the anchoring effect is probably more common in natural decision contexts
than researchers had previously thought. However, experimental results also
suggest that due to the lack of a comparison process between anchors and
targets, basic anchoring effects are fragile and can easily disappear (Wilson
et al., 1996).
The majority of the literature focuses on traditional anchoring effects and a
number of factors have been demonstrated to affect the degree of anchoring: for
example, the sources of anchors (self-generated or externally provided), the
relevance of anchors to targets, and the level of knowledge or experience of
decision makers. Individuals anchor their judgments more on self-generated
rather than externally provided anchors and the adjustments made from the
former are less than those from the latter (eg, Cervon and Peake, 1986;
Northcraft and Neale, 1987; Strack andMussweiler, 1997). This arises because
individuals are more likely to conﬁrm internally generated knowledge (self-
generated anchors) and view it as relevant to the targets. Consequently,
adjustments from self-generated anchors are less than those from externally
provided anchors (Davies, 1997; Hinsz et al., 1997;Mussweiler and Neumann,
2000).
A number of studies suggest that anchoring effects occur even when the
anchor value is unreasonable, implausibly extreme, or completely irrelevant
to the target value (Cervone and Peake, 1986; Chapman and Johnson, 1994;
Mussweiler and Strack, 1996b; Mussweiler and Strack, 2000b; Strack and
Mussweiler, 1997). The accuracy of judgments based on relevant anchors is
demonstrated to be higher than that based on irrelevant or randomly selected
anchors (Bazerman, 1990) but anchors that are relevant to the targets cause
higher degrees of anchoring than those which are irrelevant (Chapman and
Johnson, 1994).
Research suggests that even those with relevant experience, knowledge or
expertise
1
are subject to anchoring effects (eg, Diaz, III, 1997; Joyce and
Biddle, 1981; Mussweiler and Strack, 2000b; Northcraft and Neale, 1987;
Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) but to a lesser extent than those without
these advantages (Bhattacharjee and Moreno, 2002; Mussweiler and Strack,
2000b).
The durability of anchoring effects has attracted the increasing interest of
researchers (eg, Mussweiler, 2001; Srull and Wyer, 1979). It is suggested that
the length of anchoring effects depends on the frequency with which relevant
information is involved during the judgmental process and is highly related to
the source of anchors (Mussweiler, 2001). In particular, the greater the amount
of alternative information and the more often it is encountered in the
judgmental process the more likely it is to be used as new priming events; thus
reducing or eliminating the effect of anchoring on previous priming events
(Srull and Wyer, 1979).
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III. ANCHORING EFFECTS IN REAL WORLD
ENVIRONMENTS
Laboratory-based v naturalistic studies
To date anchoring effects have largely been examined under controlled
experimental conditions. Laboratory experiments offer a number of
advantages over ﬁeld-based studies but also lack some vital features
contained in real world decision environments (Bruce and Johnson, 1997). In
this section, the distinctions between laboratory-based and naturalistic studies
are summarised and the beneﬁts of exploring anchoring effects in real world
environments, and in horserace betting markets in particular, are explored.
Two key aspects distinguish laboratory and real world decision settings:
the nature of (i) decision tasks and (ii) decision makers. In terms of decision
tasks, three distinguishing features can be identiﬁed. First, laboratory
experiments enable researchers to investigate the effect and interaction of
discrete factors under a set of manufactured and controlled conditions, with
control groups to provide comparative results. Hence laboratory experiments
enable the isolation of particular factors for separate analysis and comparison,
whereas in natural settings all factors interact and it is difﬁcult to separate the
inﬂuence of individual factors. However, this also implies that experiments
‘‘often omit vital elements which are present in a real-world decision
environment’’ (Bruce and Johnson, 1997; p.287). Second, laboratory
experiments are usually conducted in low-stakes, stress free settings, whilst
in the real world decision makers are often involved in high-stakes, stressful
environments (Yates, 1992). Because the risks taken in laboratories and real
world are different, individuals may behave differently in these contexts
(Anderson and Brown, 1984). Third, laboratory experiments often use
subjective evaluations such as the degree of perceived risk or degree of
conﬁdence in making a correct decision to measure the impact or performance
of decision tasks (Bruce and Johnson, 1997) whereas in naturalistic
environments, reliable objective measures are often available to evaluate
decision quality.
A number of factors associated with decision makers also vary between
laboratory and real world studies. First, in laboratory studies, participants are
often aware that they are involved in a controlled experiment and this may
affect their behaviour (Bruce and Johnson, 1997). Second, laboratory-based
studies often use undergraduate students as subjects and they may be
unfamiliar with the constructed decision tasks or may lack the experience of
solving such problems. In the real world, decision makers are more likely to
repeatedly face similar tasks so that they gain experience in the decision
domain and decision judgments made by ‘experts’ are often more accurate
than those made by ‘novices’ (Christensen-Szalanski et al., 1983).
Taken together, features of laboratory-based and naturalistic studies differ
in many ways and each offers certain advantages and disadvantages.
However, the anchoring literature is largely based on laboratory studies and it
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is therefore appropriate to examine to what extent the observed anchoring
effects translate to real world environments.
Horserace betting markets
The aim is to observe to what extent anchoring effects demonstrated in
laboratory experiments feature in dynamic, naturalistic settings and horserace
betting markets provide an ideal environment for a number of reasons. First,
these markets meet all the criteria demanded by Orasanu and Connolly (1993)
for a dynamic, naturalistic decision-making setting. For example, in this
market, each element of the decision-making event (eg, participants, location,
and conditions) is unique so that the performance of participants is uncertain.
The market is also dynamic because the odds of each horse in a race are
continuously changing and bettors must make decisions in a limited time
period; and it has been shown that this period is sufﬁcient for bettors to make
good decisions (Johnson and Bruce, 2001). In addition, the horserace betting
market involves action-feedback loops. Bettors make explicit or implicit
subjective estimates of the horses’ probability of winning based on a variety of
information (eg, past performance of the horse, jockey and trainer) and once
the race result is known the bettors are able to use the feedback to update their
decision models. Such action-feedback loops are regarded as important for
making dynamic decisions in naturalistic settings (Orasanu and Connolly,
1993).
Second, horserace betting markets offer a setting similar to that found in
wider ﬁnancial markets. For example, bettors have at their disposal a large
quantity of relevant decision data, including professional analyses and advice,
and the stakes at risk are meaningful to the participants (in contrast to the
stakes in many laboratory experiments). In addition, the odds in betting
markets are formed as a result of the judgments of a large number of different
individuals; overcoming the potential sample size bias experienced in some
laboratory experiments which involve a relatively small number of
participants.
Third, analysis of betting market data allows for the investigation of
behaviour without the individuals being aware that their decisions are being
scrutinized. Therefore, the effects that are detected are more likely to reﬂect
the individuals’ genuine decision behaviour. The few anchoring studies which
have been conducted in other real world contexts (eg, amongst auditors or real
estate agents) employ questionnaires or observe behaviour associated with
artiﬁcially constructed projects (Bhattacharjee and Moreno, 2002; Diaz III,
1997; Joyce and Biddle, 1981; Northcraft and Neale, 1987); decision makers
are, consequently, still aware that they are being investigated and this may
cause them to alter their behaviour.
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether anchoring effects occur
in real, risky decision environments and, for the reasons outline above, the use
of data from the horserace betting market offers a number of advantages.
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IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The study focuses on the degree of anchoring displayed in the horserace
market as a whole rather than the behavioural biases displayed by individual
bettors. Clearly, the market represents the aggregated decisions of individual
bettors and will to some extent reﬂect individual decision making biases.
However, market behaviour may differ from that of many individuals due to
interactions between market participants and the uneven inﬂuences of
particular individuals on the ﬁnal market odds (Wallsten et al., 1997). As such
the study departs from the traditional approach to examining individual
anchoring effects in the laboratory but represents one of the ﬁrst attempts to
examine the phenomenon in a market context.
The data and methodology for detecting anchoring effects in the horserace
betting market are described in this section.
Data
The data are drawn from a pari-mutuel betting market where the price of each
bet (odds) is determined largely by the decisions of bettors, in contrast to
bookmaker markets where odds are determined by the actions of both bettors
and bookmakers. Consequently, the pari-mutuel market provides an ideal
context for investigating bettors’ subjective probability judgments and
decision preferences without inﬂuences from the supply-side of the market (ie,
bookmakers).
The data includes details of the total stakes on win bets in the pari-mutuel
market on each of 33,304 horses in 2,579 races run at the Happy Valley and
Sha Tin racetracks in Hong Kong over the period 1995–2000.
2
The number of
the horses in each race varies from 7 to 14, with a mode of 14. The total stakes
on each horse are collected at the close of the market. In addition, the database
includes details of the past ﬁnishing positions of each horse, whether the
previous race run at the meeting was won by a favourite, and whether the
jockey or trainer of each horse won his/her last race.
Procedures
In a pari-mutuel market the odds on horse i in race j (O
ij
) are determined by the
proportion of money bet on horse i in race j, as follows:
O
ij
¼
P
n
j
i¼1
V
ij
V
ij
 
ð12 dÞ2 1ð1Þ
where V
ij
¼ amount bet on horse i, d ¼ pari-mutuel operator’s deduction,
n
j
¼ number of horses in race j. It is argued that bettors will continue to place
money on a horse i in race j until the odds accurately reﬂects the market’s best
estimate of the horse’s chance of winning the race (Asch et al., 1984;
Figlewski, 1979; Johnson and Bruce, 2001). The ratio, p
s
ij
¼ V
ij
=
P
n
j
i¼1
V
ij
, can
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therefore be regarded as the subjective probability judgment of the betting
public concerning horse i’s prospects of winning race j.
The aim is to assess to what extent the bettors’ subjective assessment of
horse i’s chance of success in race j, p
s
ij
, is a reﬂection of the horse’s true or
objective probability of success, p
o
ij
, or whether bettors anchor their
judgements on particular pieces of information. To achieve this objective
two modelling procedures are adopted: conditional logit and linear regression.
Conditional logit
Under the competitive conditions of a horse race an efﬁcient probability
estimate of horse i’s chance of winning race j is more likely to be obtained if
its chance of winning is regarded as being conditional on the information
available for the other runners in race j. To achieve this a ‘winningness index’
for horse i in race j is deﬁned as: w
ij
¼ a
k
A
ik
þ b ln ð p
s
ij
Þ þ j
ij
, where A
ik
is the
value for horse i of the kth factor on which bettors may anchor their
judgements (eg, a dummy variable indicating whether the horse won its last
race), a
k
and b measure the contribution of the kth anchoring factor and the
bettors’ aggregate subjective probability of horse i winning race j,
respectively, and j
ij
is the measurement error. The probability of horse i
winning race j is therefore given by:
p
o
ij
¼ prðw
ij
. w
lj
; l ¼ 1;2; . . . n
j
; l – iÞ
¼ prða
k
A
ik
þ b ln ð p
s
ij
Þ þ j
ij
. a
k
A
lk
þ b ln ð p
s
lj
Þ þ j
lj
; l ¼ 1;2:::n
j
; l – iÞ
The w
ij
can not be observed directly, but whether horse i wins race j can be
observed; so a win/lose variable t
ij
is deﬁned such that: t
ij
¼ 1 if w
ij
¼
Maxðw
1j
w
2j;
. . .w
n
j
j
Þ; t
ij
¼ 0 otherwise. Consequently, the probability of
horse i winning race j can be represented as follows:
p
ij
¼ Pr t
ij
¼ 1 ln p
s
ij
 
;A
ik
i ¼ 1; 2 . . . ; n
j



 
. McFadden (1974) demonstrates
that if it is assumed that the error terms j
ij
are independent and distributed
according to the double exponential distribution, the probability of horse i
winning race j is given by a conditional logit function, as follows
p
o
ij
¼
exp a
k
A
ik
þ b ln p
s
ij
  
P
n
j
i¼1
exp a
k
A
ik
þ b ln p
s
ij
  
for i ¼ 1; 2; . . . n
j
ð2Þ
The parameters a
k
and b, are estimated by maximizing the joint probability
of observing the results of all N races in the sample. Using equation (2),
if bettors’ subjective estimates of horses’ chance of winning perfectly
match their objective probabilities, a
k
would equal 0 and b would equal 1 (ie,
p
o
ij
¼ p
s
ij
). However, ifa
k
is signiﬁcantly less than 0 this indicates that bettors’
subjective probabilities are overly inﬂuenced by the kth factor (A
ik
), suggesting
that they have anchored unduly on this factor when forming their judgements.
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The factors, A
ik
, which are selected as possible anchors, include those
frequently discussed by bettors, namely factors related to the previous
performances of horses, jockeys and trainers. In particular, we examine the
degree towhich bettors anchor on the following aspects of the past performance
of horses: (i) the average ﬁnishing position of a horse over its career (with more
recent results being more heavily weighted than earlier results: RNF); (ii)
whether the horse won its last race (HWL takes the value 1 if the horse won its
last race and 0 otherwise) and (iii) whether the favourite won the last race at the
race meeting (ie, does this encourage bettors to over-bet the favourite in the
next race): FWL is deﬁned such that the favourite of the current race is assigned
a value of 1 if the favourite won the last race at the meeting, 0 otherwise.
Anchoring effects related to jockeys and trainers are assessed by examining the
extent to which over-betting occurs on horses ridden by jockeys and/or from a
trainer’s stable whose previous mount or runner, respectively, have won their
last race (JWL is given the value 1 if a jockey won on the last horse he/she rode
and TWL is assigned a value of 1 if the trainer’s last runner won its race).
Linear regression
The conditional logit function represented by equation (2) enables the type
of information bettors use to assess the chances of a horse winning to be
discerned. However, it is only estimated on the basis of data concerning
winning horses. Consequently, it overlooks the ability of bettors to discriminate
between horses which ﬁnish further down the ﬁeld (eg, in 2
nd
, 3
rd
etc). In order
to incorporate data concerning the ﬁnishing position of all horses in a racewhen
assessing the degree of anchoring in bettors’ judgements, parameters of
equations of the following form are estimated using OLS regression:
NFP
ij
¼ x
k
A
ik
þ d ln p
s
ij
þ j
ij
ð3Þ
whereNFP
ij
represents the normalized ﬁnishing position of horse i in race j and
is given by 0:52 ðordinal finishing position2 0:5Þ=number of runners
(Brecher, 1980). A horse ﬁnishing 5
th
in a 5-horse ﬁeld has not beaten
any horses, whereas a horse ﬁnishing 5
th
in a 30-horse ﬁeld has beaten the other
25 horses. Therefore, in order to ensure that the ﬁnishing position is comparable
between races normalisation is undertaken. Since NFP ranges from 2 0.5 to
0.5 in all races, whatever the number of runners, it provides a consistent
measure for determining how well (in relation to other horses in the race) a
particular horse ran. If the coefﬁcient x
k
in equation (3) is signiﬁcantly less than
0, this would imply that bettors anchor their subjective probability judgements
on the variable A
ik
, when assessing the likely ﬁnishing position of all runners.
V. RESULTS
Horses’ past performances
The results of estimating the conditional logit and the linear regression
models associated with the degree to which bettors employ information
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concerning horses’ previous performances in their subjective probability
judgements are given in Tables 1 and 2 respectively.
From the results of the ﬁrst four models displayed in Tables 1 and 2 it is
clear that the bettors’ subjective probability judgements ð ln ðp
s
ij
ÞÞ, the recency
weighted normalised ﬁnishing position of a horse over all its career starts
TABLE 2
RESULTS OF ESTIMATING LINEAR REGRESSION EQUATIONS WITH NORMALISED FINISHING
POSITION REGRESSED ON FACTORS RELATED TO HORSES’ PAST PERFORMANCES AND BETTORS’
SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY JUDGEMENTS
Coefﬁcient(s) in model
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ln p
s
ij
0.139* 0.122* 0.138* 0.138*
0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
RNF
a
0.576* 0.160*
0.009 0.011
HWL
b
0.119* 0.007
0.006 0.006
FWL
c
0.248* 0.016
0.012 0.011
R
2
0.208 0.109 0.011 0.012 0.213 0.208 0.208
a
RNF: represents the recency weighted normalised ﬁnish position of a horse over all its career starts.
b
HWL: is a dummy variable representing whether the horse won its last race (1 won, 0 otherwise).
c
FWL: the favourite of current race is assigned a value of 1 if the favourite won the last race at the meeting,
0 otherwise.
Standard errors are in italics.
* Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
TABLE 1
RESULTS OF ESTIMATING CONDITIONAL LOGIT MODELS INCORPORATING HORSES’ PAST
PERFORMANCES AND BETTORS’ SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY JUDGMENTS
Coefﬁcient(s) in model
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ln p
s
ij
0.994* 0.932* 0.992* 0.993*
0.025 0.032 0.026 0.027
RNF
a
4.213* 0.589*
0.144 0.182
HWL
b
0.786* 0.021
0.060 0.066
FWL
c
1.461* 0.016
0.088 0.095
R
2
0.147 0.074 0.011 0.016 0.148 0.147 0.147
a
RNF: represents the recency weighted normalised ﬁnishing position of a horse over all its career starts.
b
HWL: is a dummy variable representing whether the horse won its last race (1 won, 0 otherwise).
c
FWL: the favourite of current race is assigned a value of 1 if the favourite won the last race at the meeting,
0 otherwise.
Standard errors are in italics.
* Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
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(RNF), whether the horse won its last race(HWL) and if a horse is favourite in
the current race when a favourite won the last race at the meeting (FWL), all
provide valuable information in terms of assessing the likely ﬁnishing position
of a horse in its current race, and the probability of each horse winning.
This conclusion can be drawn since the coefﬁcients of all four variables in the
linear regression equations with normalised ﬁnishing position as dependent
variable and in the equivalent conditional logit models are positive and
signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. However, it is evident from the R
2
values for
the ﬁrst four linear regression and conditional logit models that bettors’
subjective judgements, revealed as odds, contain far more valuable
information concerning a horse’s ﬁnishing position than the other variables
(RNF, HWL or FWL). Results for model 5, reported in Tables 1 and 2, suggest
that bettors do not fully account for the previous ﬁnishing position of horses
over their whole career when assessing the likely ﬁnishing order of horses and
when assessing the probability of each horse winning the race, since the
coefﬁcient of RNF is positive and signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 5
percent level when combined in a model with the bettors’ subjective
probability judgements (in both the linear regression and conditional logit
models). Models 6 and 7 suggest that bettors fully discount, in the odds,
information regarding whether a horse won its last race (HWL) and whether
the horse is favourite in the current race when a favourite won the last race
(FWL). This conclusion can be drawn since the coefﬁcients of these variables
in both the linear regression and conditional logit models are not signiﬁcantly
different to zero at the 5 percent level when these variables are combined in a
model with the subjective probabilities derived from market odds.
Taken together the results of estimating models 1–7 suggest that
information concerning whether a horse won its previous race, whether a
horse is favourite in the current race when a favourite won the previous race at
the meeting and the normalised ﬁnishing position of a horse throughout its
career all provide valuable information for discriminating between the likely
ﬁnishing position of horses in a race and in assessing each horse’s probability
of winning. However, bettors do not appear to unduly anchor their judgements
on this information.
Past performances of jockeys and trainers
The conditional logit model results exploring anchoring effects based on
the past performances of jockeys and trainers are reported in Table 3 and
equivalent linear regression results are presented in Table 4. Once again the
two modelling approaches produce consistent ﬁndings. The results
demonstrate that the likely ﬁnishing position of a horse and its probability
of winning are both enhanced if the horse’s jockey won his/her last race
(JWL ¼ 1) and if the last horse to run from a trainer’s stable won
(TWL ¼ 1). This conclusion can be drawn since coefﬁcients of JWL and
TWL in the conditional logit and linear regression models are both positive
THE JOURNAL OF GAMBLING BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS2007, 1 1
78
and signiﬁcant. However, when these variables are incorporated in linear
regression and conditional logit models together with log of winning
probability derived from pari-mutuel market odds, their coefﬁcients do not
make a signiﬁcant difference to the expected normalised ﬁnish position nor to
the probability of winning, respectively.
The results relating to the previous performances of trainers and jockeys
suggest that this information is useful in trying to assess a horse’s likely
ﬁnishing position and its probability of winning but that this information is
TABLE 4
RESULTS OF ESTIMATING LINEAR REGRESSION EQUATIONS WITH NORMALISED FINISH POSITION
REGRESSED ON FACTORS RELATED TO JOCKEYS’ AND TRAINERS’ PREVIOUS RACE PERFORMANCE
AND BETTORS’ SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY JUDGEMENTS
Coefﬁcient(s) in model
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
ln p
s
ij
0.139* 0.139* 0.139*
0.001 0.001 0.001
JWL
a
0.043* 0.004
0.003 0.006
TWL
b
0.028* 0.004
0.006 0.006
R
2
0.208 0.001 0.001 0.208 0.208
a
JWL: assigned a value of 1 if the horse’s jockey won on his/her last ride, 0 otherwise.
b
TWL: assigned a value of 1 if the previous horse to run from the trainer’s stable won, 0 otherwise.
Standard errors are in italics.
*
Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
TABLE 3
RESULTS OF ESTIMATING CONDITIONAL LOGIT MODELS INCORPORATING JOCKEYS’ AND
TRAINERS’ PREVIOUS RACE PERFORMANCES AND BETTORS’ SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY
JUDGMENTS
Coefﬁcient(s) in model
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
ln p
s
ij
0.994* 0.995* 0.994*
0.025 0.025 0.025
JWL
a
0.181* 2 0.019
0.070 0.072
TWL
b
0.164* 0.030
0.070 0.073
R
2
0.147 0.001 0.001 0.147 0.147
a
JWL: assigned a value of 1 if the horse’s jockey won on his/her last ride, 0 otherwise.
b
TWL: assigned a value of 1 if the previous horse to run from the trainer’s stable won, 0 otherwise.
Standard errors are in italics.
*
Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
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fully discounted in pari-mutuel market odds; and bettors do not appear to
anchor on this information.
VI. DISCUSSION
Overall the results suggest that bettors do not anchor their judgements on a
variety of variables associated with the previous performances of horses,
trainers or jockeys. In fact they appear to effectively discount the majority of
this information in their subjective probability judgements which are revealed
as pari-mutuel odds (other than the recency weighted normalised ﬁnish
position of horses throughout their career). This is a surprising result given the
wealth of laboratory based studies which demonstrate the powerful anchoring
effect of data presented prior to judgements being made. There are a number
of possible reasons for the contrasting ﬁndings of the current study and
previous work exploring anchoring. These are related to the decision
environment in which the judgements are made, the nature of the decision task
and the decision makers.
There is a clear distinction between the real world environment faced by
pari-mutuel bettors and the sterile, artiﬁcial environment faced by subjects in
many laboratory experiments. Bettors operate in an environment which
contains a number of action-feedback loops, where decisions are dynamic and
can be adjusted in the light of past successes and mistakes; this is rarely the
case in previous laboratory based anchoring studies. Feedback has been
shown to have a positive inﬂuence on the accuracy of judgements (eg,
McClelland and Bolger, 1994). In addition, the betting task is a fairly uniform
one, with regular immediate feedback and both these factors have been shown
to improve calibration (Lock, 1987).
The pari-mutuel betting market is a ‘high stakes’ environment; where
bettors have a clear incentive to make good decisions, since they are risking
their own money; and they are likely to bet in such a way that the potential
returns are meaningful to them. In addition, previous literature has suggested
that the existence of multiple self-interested participants may enhance the
effects of the incentives in the market (Waller et al., 1999). This is precisely
the situation in the pari-mutuel market, where a bettor’s potential returns are
directly determined by the actions of other bettors. Consequently, individual
bettors adjust their betting decisions by watching other bettors’ actions,
revealed via the odds (Johnson and Bruce, 2001). It is difﬁcult for experiments
in the laboratory to recreate such an incentive-rich, competitive environment
and it is unlikely that subjects taking part in laboratory studies are as highly
motivated to make accurate judgements as the majority of horserace bettors.
It should also be noted that the current study explores the anchoring
effects of a market made up of a variety of individuals. It has been shown that
the interaction between individuals in markets can signiﬁcantly reduce errors
(Wallsten et al., 1997). This results from a variety of causes, not least the fact
that different individuals use different decision-making procedures and have
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diverse information gathering skills. As a result their reaction to the same
information may vary. It is possible that ‘‘certain biases present in an
individual bettor’s decisions are being counterbalanced by opposite biases in
other bettors’ decisions’’ (Johnson and Bruce, 2001; p. 280). Consequently, it
is possible that the anchoring of some individuals is offset by the under-
weighting of the same piece of information by others. This is made more
likely in a betting market context (cf the laboratory) because of the low
possibility of collusive behaviour between individual bettors (Johnson and
Bruce, 2001). Individuals who believe they hold privileged information or
skills in predicting outcomes have a strong incentive not to divulge this
information to others; who, through a bandwagon effect, could substantially
reduce the odds on the intended target horse.
In addition to the factors in the betting environment which reduce the
likelihood of bettors anchoring their judgements, there are also distinct
differences between bettors and the subjects of most laboratory experiments.
These differences might also help explain the contrasting results of the current
study and most anchoring studies conducted in the laboratory. The majority of
pari-mutuel bettors are familiar with the betting task, unlike many of the
subjects in laboratory experiments who face tasks for which they have no
relevant experience. In fact, those laboratory experiments which do compare
the performances of those with more and less experience of the decision task
identify less anchoring for the former group (eg, Bhattacharjee and Moreno,
2002; Diaz, III, 1997; Mussweiler and Strack, 2000; Northcraft and Neale,
1987). In addition, it has been suggested that due to the very large betting
volumes on Hong Kong races these markets attract a number of professional
betting organisations since they can bet with high stakes without damaging
their returns. As a result they can recoup the large expenses associated with
collecting/analysing data for modelling the likely results of horseraces
(Benter, 1994). In fact, it is clear from presentations given at a number of
conferences that a number of betting syndicates do operate in the Hong Kong
horseracing betting market.
In summary, the results suggest that horserace bettors in Hong Kong do
not anchor their judgements on the most obvious pieces of information
concerning previous performances of horses, jockeys or trainers. This may
indicate that anchoring effects observed in the laboratory are not as common
in real world decision settings, particularly amongst decision-makers who are
familiar with their decision domain.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper has suggested an effective method of exploring anchoring effects
in a real world setting, the pari-mutuel horserace betting market. New
evidence is presented which questions the degree to which anchoring effects
observed in the laboratory inﬂuence the subjective judgements of decision
makers in naturalistic environments. A number of factors are identiﬁed as the
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potential reason for this, including features of real world environments which
distinguish them from laboratory settings, and, in particular, aspects of the
horserace betting market which facilitate good calibration.
Naturalistic environments differ from experimental settings in a number
of ways, including: (i) their higher level of complexity; (ii) the greater stress
and personal stakes facing real world decision makers (implying that
individuals may take their real world (cf laboratory-based) decision making
more seriously); and (iii) the fact that individuals in laboratory experiments
are aware that their decisions are being scrutinised, which may result in a
change in their behaviour. In addition, a number of features of horserace
betting markets are identiﬁed as being likely to reduce anchoring effects,
including: (i) the prevalence of decision makers who are familiar with the
betting task; (ii) an environment characterised by action-feedback loops in
which bettors can quickly learn to adjust their future decisions in the light of
past successes and failures; and (iii) a market context in which the interaction
of individuals and the offsetting of biases can result in subjective judgements
which are well calibrated.
The results presented here represent a preliminary study of anchoring
effects in the horserace betting market. Only a limited number of potential
anchoring factors have been examined and these need to be expanded in future
studies before it can be concluded that anchoring does not exist in the
horserace betting market. In addition, it is possible that sophisticated
mathematical models employed by some professional syndicates help
eliminate any anchoring effects demonstrated by the rest of the betting public.
Consequently, further analysis is currently being undertaken to examine the
extent to which anchoring effects differ between casual and professional/ 
expert bettors.
In summary, the results reported here challenge the consensus to emerge
from laboratory based studies, and suggest that anchoring effects may not be
as widespread in real world decision making environments as previously
thought.
NOTES
1. The terms “experience”, “knowledge”, and “expertise” are highly related but different concepts.
Experience is the participation in or observation of an event and it is argued that, in general, the more
experience people have in a speciﬁc ﬁeld, the more knowledge they gain about this ﬁeld. Knowledge is
the understanding or awareness of a subject gained through experience or study. Expertise refers to
professional knowledge and/or skills in a particular ﬁeld, which can either be gained from experience or
from other sources.
2. We would like to thank Mr. William Benter for providing these data.
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